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Abstract
The need for shared understanding in the analysis of terrorist activity has been a
clearly defined national priority for over a decade. We present a foundation for an
ontology to represent adversary groups and their intentions, classification of their
weapons and attack types, and the ability to represent the relationship between the
outcomes of an attack and the various recognized intentions of the adversary group.
This Adversary-Intent-Target (AIT) model focuses on structuring knowledge to allow
reasoning about which groups would be likely to choose what kinds of weapons to
perform which kinds of attack. The AIT model is a generalizable and extensible
system for organizing the relevant information, serving as an preliminary ontology
within a larger computational system.
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1 Introduction
Inter-office and inter-agency coordination of intelligence information is vital to the
security of the United States. However current systems in place to perform this
coordinating function, when they exist at all, are not sufficiently developed to make
light work of the task. The work presented here is part of a larger project to automate,
as much as possible, the merger of this information using computational tools.1 One
distinctive feature of the project is the use of the mathematics of Category Theory
to preserve the logical structure of the information as it is processed and the upfront
recognition of the need for a specialized vocabulary for interoperability.
The software tools being developed require a semantic “grounding,” that is, a
controlled vocabulary of terms (words) with a fixed set of relations on the terms
of that vocabulary that enforce a logical structure. Together these features form an
ontology, in this case an ontology for terrorism research. With such an ontology in
place, unthinking machinery can do a wide variety of (seemingly) intelligent reasoning
tasks while still preventing the results from becoming semantic gibberish.
The problem addressed by our group is the actual construction of such a core
vocabulary. One that is sufficient for the description, discussion, and analysis of
terrorist attacks; pre-incident, post-incident, and ongoing; hypothetical and real.
The ultimate goal and product of this research is the development of a system
that we refer to as the Basic Ontology Of Terrorism or BOOT. Such a system
represents a significant number of technical and social challenges. To be useful in real
intelligence work, it must provide analysts with an environment that is natural for
them to use (not asking them to unlearn all their previous training and experience)
while simultaneously making more relevant information available. Further, it must
not increase the informational load on the analyst user base. It must work across
different fixed institutional vocabularies and knowledge bases by allowing different
points of view to be represented and keeping the merging of these points of view away
from the user base (unless the analyst wants the additional information). Finally, it
must be usable for exchanging information among analysts meeting their needs for
information sharing while simultaneously maintaining information security.
One issue that is very clear at present is that the construction of a system such as
BOOT requires input from a broad range of experts both from knowledge engineering
and from the specific domains of use: intelligence analysts, military and operations
managers, various governmental systems operators, agency supervisors, etc. As such,
our group is particularly concerned with developing the foundational vocabulary that
1Contract: DTRA01-03-D-0009-0026, “Pre-incident Analysis using Multigraphs and Faceted
Ontologies,” T.P. Caudell, principle investigator.
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acts as a base to which domain experts can easily add to in order to build a usable
system customizable to their own mission, operating environment, and needs. We
also seek to establish a foundational system that automated agents can extend to
cover new knowledge, in a fashion similar to the connections that exist between
SUMO (the Suggested Upper Merged Ontology) and Princeton’s WordNet.2
Such a natural language acquisition system, based on WordNet but with specialized
vocabulary from terrorism research (Terrornet), would allow automated agents to
incorporate information from both open sources (news reports, etc.) and specialized
intelligence reports.
Such complex systems as BOOT and Terrornet are currently beyond the scope
of this project, but in the present work we developed clear requirements that such
systems must address and determined a number of problems that must be solved in
order to develop them. These topics will be discussed at the end of this paper. As
the scope of this final project depends on the intellectual input of a large number of
people, we focus here on a smaller related problem.
In this paper we develop and analyze a pre-incident subsystem of the larger BOOT
system as a test case. We refer to this subsystem as the the Adversary–Intent–
Target (AIT) model. This model reflects the analysis of a single sentence that acts
as its organizing principle (detailed below; section 3.1). AIT has been developed
sufficiently for software testing purposes and its foundation provides a model useful
for further research. This work is related to, but not identical with, previous work on
“pre-incident indicator analysis,” which addresses prerequisites for terrorist attacks
and was developed by some of the present project team.3
Ultimately even a small subsystem such as AIT will have to deal with issues
of reliability of information, probabilities of events, and varying levels of expert
certainty, but in this first phase of the research we develop the basic logical skeleton
that a language for terrorism research must have. We will proceed as follows: first,
the basic ideas of ontologies and related structures are discussed, as well as the
languages/formats for storing them. Next, the development and structure of AIT is
explained. Finally, future work on BOOT and AIT is discussed as well as a few of
the major challenges faced in the development of such systems. We do not discuss
the machine processing of AIT; that presentation will be forthcoming.
2SUMO: http://www.ontologyportal.org/; WordNet: http://wordnet.princeton.edu/.
WordNet is the registered trademark of Princeton University. WordNet is released under the Word-
Net license; Princeton University claims the system is “unencumbered” for commercial use, however
the Open Source Initiative (http://www.opensource.org/) does not specifically recognize the li-
cense as meeting the “open source” definition and requirements.
3T. Caudell, F. Gilfeather, M. R. Taha, and D. Weinberg, Pre-Incident Indicator Analysis (PIIA)
System, UNM ECE Technical Report, in preparation, August 2011.
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2 Knowledge Representation & Ontologies
The problem before us is the same, either in building BOOT or the smaller AIT,
and it is one of knowledge engineering. Our approach here is to build an ontology
(defined in section 2.2 and discussed in 2.3) that provides a collection of basic terms
for terrorism research and also encodes the relationships among those terms. The
AIT model is based on a “model statement” (section 3.1) that implies a particular
organization of knowledge about reality that the ontology must reflect. To build this
ontology we must discover the concepts (terms or classes) that are natural to the
question, list them, and then make explicit the relationships among these terms.
Before delving into AIT’s structure, we discuss some details of ontological mod-
eling and terminology.
2.1 Simple Structures: Taxonomies & Partonomies
One of the simplest representations of concepts, and one that is already known to
most people, is a taxonomy. A taxonomy is a hierarchical system of classification,
in which the only relationship between terms is the subset relation. The terms in a
taxonomy are always sets; taxonomies do not include individual members of the sets.
In taxonomic and ontology research the word class is usually used as a synonym for
set.4
The relation is called subset or subclass, but it is sometimes mistranslated as “is-
a” (labeled isA or ISA in some systems). Whenever is-a is used to discuss set-to-set
relations it usually means “is-a-type-of” or “is-a-kind-of,” which, for our purposes,
is equivalent to the mathematical subset relation that we use. However, is-a can also
be used to refer to individuals, not sets or classes, and that relationship is not the
same as subset (it is the “element-of” relation). We do not discuss any set elements
here, so in this work is-a would always be translated as is-a-kind-of or subset.
Examples of the subset relation abound: a dog is-a kind of animal (that is, the
set of dogs is a subset of the set of all animals or a dog is-a-kind-of animal), nuclear
weapons are-a subclass of weapons, the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) is-a specific kind of
right-wing Christian group, etc.5 The common feature is that the subset or subclass
4Logicians in this field may require the distinction between sets and classes as used, for instance,
in Russell’s type theory and other systems, but practitioners rarely make these technical distinctions
[3].
5 Referring to the KKK as a set, rather than as an element of a set (a specific group) may
seem unnatural, but formally it is not a problem. This is a common approach in foundational
mathematics, for example, where elements of sets are never referred to at all in the definition of
the concept of “number” [3]. For our purposes it is a formal contrivance.
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is more specific than the superset or superclass, and that every member of the subset
is also a member of the superset.
This subset relation, denoted ⊆, is a partial order which has three defining
properties: it is reflexive, anti-symmetric, and transitive (often referred to as
RAT).6 By reflexive, we mean that each class is a subclass of itself (A ⊆ A), so, for
instance, the set of dogs is a subset of the set of dogs.7 Anti-symmetric means that
if A is a subclass of B then B is not a subclass of A ((A ⊆ B)⇒ (B * A)), unless A
and B are the same (unless A = B). For example, given that “nuclear weapons” are
a subclass of weapon, we have automatically that the more general class of “weapon”
is not a subclass of the more specific nuclear weapon. The transitive property means
that if A is a subclass of B and B is a subclass of C, then A is automatically also a
subclass of C (A ⊆ B ∧ B ⊆ C ⇒ A ⊆ C). So the KKK is a subclass of right-wing
Christian groups, which in turn are a subclass of religious groups, and so the KKK
is a subclass of religious groups.
There is a single term at the top of a taxonomy which, by transitivity, is the
superclass of every term in the taxonomy. This term is the most generic object set
possible, usually called “thing” or “top” and denoted by the symbol >.8 Because
this is the superset of every other set in the taxonomy, we have that every more
specific object defined in the hierarchy is also a “thing,” which is consistent with the
common use of the word.
It is important to note that taxonomies can be viewed in two ways. The first,
and most common way, is to visualize them as a tree or tree-like structure, as in
figure 1. However, this picture can be flattened; because the subsets are contained
within the supersets, one can visualize the situation as smaller and smaller subsets
contained within each other and with the largest set being thing or > in a format
similar to a Venn diagram as in figure 2.
6In some works, especially those using descriptive logic, the symbol v is used for the logical
equivalent of ⊆.
7If this seems strange, accept it as a vacuous mathematical necessity to make other definitions
work correctly. Similar to the formal requirement discussed in footnote 5.
8We will not need it for the work presented here, but there is also a corresponding term called
“nothing” or “bottom,” denoted ⊥. For lattice/partially ordered structures, this object also exists.
While > can be thought of as the most generic thing, a thing without any distinguishing properties,
⊥ can be thought of as the thing which (inconsistently) has every possible property. In the current
example, for the subset relation, ⊥ represents the empty set (∅) which is—by definition—a subset
of every other set.
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Figure 1: Taxonomy visualized as a tree-like structure. This is the traditional rep-
resentation.
Figure 2: Taxonomy visualized as a Venn diagram. While not usually viewed in this
form, it clearly represents the subsets in a more natural way.
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The nature of the subset relation defines a subsumptive hierarchy, as each su-
perclass subsumes or contains the elements of all its subclasses. So, a taxonomy is
a subsumptive hierarchy. Terminology in the literature is somewhat confusing on
this, with taxonomic hierarchies being called “nested hierarchies” and, if the subset
relation is strict (that is, never allowing A = B to hold between sets in the anti-
symmetric property above), then the taxonomy becomes a “containment hierarchy”
which is often viewed as the definitive subsumptive hierarchy. This despite the fact
that in some sense all taxonomies “contain” in the sense of the subset relation.
Another single-relationship scheme is a partonomy, also called a compositional
hierarchy or a compositional containment hierarchy.9 In a partonomy, the relation-
ship between terms is “part of,” for instance: a trigger is part-of a nuclear device,
fissile material is part-of a nuclear device, Cook County is part-of Illinois which in
turn is part-of the continental United States, etc. The critical difference here is that
a partonomy is not based on a relationship of subsumption (or containment; as in the
taxonomy) but instead is based on a relationship of composition: each term in the
hierarchy is composed of the terms below it. (It should be noted that the partonomy
is still a partial order, if one allows a part to be a part of itself. For instance, Cook
County is part of Cook County, the biggest part, while Chicago is clearly only a
smaller part of the county.)
The critical difference here is that part-of relations often have to refer to individ-
uals, not sets, and terms at one level (a car, for instance) is made up of various parts
(a wheel) but those parts are not subsumed by the higher-level term (a wheel is not
a kind of car).
A taxonomy appears only useful for identifying what something is or what it is
not, that terrorist organizations are not allies, for example. For humans, there is
a lot of taxonomic detail that appears either superfluous or otherwise obvious. For
instance, the taxonomy for AIT that we discuss below says explicitly that terrorist
organizations are not the same types of thing as are weapons. But such a claim
has two critically important aspects: first, it grounds the terms so that unthinking
machines can “know” a distinction—one that they otherwise would not know or be
able to derive from the terms alone—despite the (human) apparent obviousness of
the distinction. Second, this sort of classification identifies what can be said about
a term; knowing that terrorist organizations are not the same types of thing as are
weapons entails that what we can say about weapons and what we can say about
9Also called a mereonomy or (with grammatical apologies) a mereology, with the adjectival form
“mereonomic.” Mereology is the study of part-whole relations. The literature on this topic has a
great deal to offer the more general study of ontologies, but, at present, is not very well integrated
into the literature.
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terrorist organizations—their characteristics and the relationships we know they have
with other concepts—are not the same and must be specified differently.
Taxonomies, unfortunately, cannot represent this latter information. Once we
include other relationships besides subclass we are working with an ontology.10
2.2 Ontologies & Related Structures: Definitions
The taxonomies discussed above provide a well-known and well-understood way to
organize a specific kind of knowledge, such as biological relationships (the set of
domestic cats, Felis catus, is a subset of the genus Felis ; Felis catus ⊆ Felis) or types
in mathematics (the set of rational numbers is a subset of the set of real numbers:
Q ⊆ R). The partonomy structure mentioned above is a very obvious extension
of the taxonomy replacing the subset relation with the part-of relation. One can
imagine a wide variety of similar structures generated by replacing the taxonomy’s
subset relation with some other relation (be it a partial order or not).
What all of these structures have in common is that they are single-relationship
structures. In the literature there is some confusion of terminology: some researchers
call any single-relationship structure a taxonomy, while others (the present authors
included) think that the term should be reserved strictly for subset-relation based
structures. Hence, some authors would think of a partonomy as a kind of taxon-
omy, while others would not. This situation causes some moderate terminological
confusion and will likely never sort itself out.
To fix terminology we make the following definitions:
Taxonomy A taxonomy is a tree structure that has exactly one relationship ex-
pressed in it, specifically the subset or is-a-kind-of relationship.
Partonomy A partonomy is a tree structure that has exactly one relationship, in
this case it is the part-of relationship.
Ontology An ontology is a tree like structure that has at least one relationship,
which is unspecified, and additionally may have any number of relationships.
Note that by the definitions above both the partonomy and the taxonomy are spe-
cialized types of ontologies. Further, we define:
10Sadly, the more grammatically and semantically correct ontonomy, in parallel with taxonomy
and partonomy has been lost to us.
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Singonomy A singonomy is any ontology that has exactly one relationship, what-
ever that relationship may be. The adjectival form of singonomy, singonomic,
and its complement multinomic are both useful descriptions of ontology sub-
types.
So taxonomies and partonomies are singonomies.11
2.3 Discussion: How Ontologies Are Used
Clearly the real-world cannot be well-described by any singonomy.12 Therefore to
build a structural model for AIT we will require an ontology, with its full multinomic
capacity.
So far we’ve only defined the formal structure of an ontology; intuitively it is
a tree or tree-like structure while formally it is a collection of entities and a set of
relationships among those entities. But what else can be said about it by way of
definition? The most often cited definition is:
“An ontology is an explicit specification of a conceptualization.”
Thomas Gruber [4]
Perhaps a better definition is this: an ontology is a contract for meaning [8].
That is, an ontology specifies terms and also rules for using the terms. As long as
an agent (a person or a machine) only uses the terms in the way the rules specify,
the contract guarantees that the results of these usages will be correct (for some
definition of the word “correct”). Usually this means that reasoning over the terms
with the fixed relations will not generate logical errors or inconsistencies for the
reasoning agent.
11In developing the work presented here we have found the concept of a singonomy to be useful.
Any ontology can be thought of as a collection of singonomies, where each singonomy represents the
tree (or forest) generated by a single relation taken from the ontology. Any one-relation projection
from an ontology is a singonomy.
12Notable early failures in an attempt to do this date to the beginnings of Western philosophy:
Thales (624–546 BCE), taking an ambiguous is-a relation and starting with water as his “thing” or
>; followed later by Anaximenes (585–528 BCE) conducting a similar analysis using air as the first
principle or thing. Anaximander (610–546 BCE) recognized an undifferentiated stuff or generic
thing as the root of existence, and had a scheme requiring the use of oppositions—or recognizable
binary opposites—as the principle of ontology, requiring more than a simple is-a relation. As
such, he might be viewed as the earliest ancestor to modern information science/computational
ontologies. See [1, 2].
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So while it gives a controlled vocabulary, it does not depend on human under-
standing of the terms in the vocabulary: these words no longer have more than one
meaning, there is no dependence on connotation or simile, or on other human aspects
of natural language processing. The terms have sharp, singular definitions, and inter-
act with the other terms in the vocabulary in precisely defined—or perhaps better,
precisely restricted—ways. The relationships in the ontology govern the usage of the
terms completely.
This eliminates much of the so-called grounding problem, specifically what we
will call the local grounding problem: terms are defined precisely and therefore
all their relevant semantic properties are accessible to any agent interacting with
the vocabulary (or to any programmer developing a new agent) without any need
for appeal to a higher-order intelligence to resolve the meaning of the term. (We
call this problem “local” to recognize that for very limited problem domains we
often only need a small quantity of built-in semantics to do useful work.) Another
way to describe it is to say that the necessary semantics are built into the terms,
when operating within the context of the ontology. (We call these built-in semantics
meanings interior to the ontology.)
Note, however, that the other meanings and connotations of the terms are not
necessarily irrelevant. An ontology supplies a minimum of explicit meaning required
to do useful automatic work within the controlled vocabulary. Well chosen terms,
with connotative, idiomatic, or metaphorical meanings consistent with the built-in
semantics, will be especially useful at the human-machine interface. Such terms allow
the full vagaries of human information processing while allowing machine intelligence
to extend this in useful ways. While automated agents will not and can not extend
or process these other implicit (or exterior) meanings, there in no reason to assume
that these other usages will be damaged by machine processing. Ultimately this is
an empirical question.
Essentially any version grounding problem invokes the same sort of question:
“how do you attach the semantic meaning to purely symbolic expressions?” The
sentence (symbolic expression):
I moved the horse out into the middle of the floor.
is ambiguous. If we look around and see a large animal of the species Equus ferus
caballus standing in the middle of the floor, we might be satisfied. But we might
also see a large bar shaped object, covered with leather or plastic and with two
large handles all supported on a metal stand that has been set up for a gymnastics
competition. Or instead we might see a wooden beam with four legs supporting a
carpenter’s work. The point is that the sentence is symbolically a constant, but its
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meaning (semantic value) changes depending on the context. The grounding problem
is the problem of determining this semantic value from the sentence and additional
information.
Once again this appears tedious or superfluous to humans; we are constantly
aware of our changing environmental context and adjust our vocabularies automat-
ically. We also understand connotation and simile; most people faced with a gym-
nast’s (pommel) “horse,” or a carpenter’s (saw-)“horse,” understand implicitly that
it does bear a physical or historical relationship with the animal we call a horse. But
these similarities and additional meanings need to be specified to a computer, if they
are to be used, or sacrificed as meanings lost at the human-machine interface.
The main method of dealing with grounding in ontology research is through
domain restriction. By giving words singular definitions, precisely defined rules
for use, and limiting systems to dealing with just one domain at a time, the grounding
problem can be solved, at least partially.
A more general approach, one that attempts to extend the grounding beyond
a single domain, is the use of so-called “upper” or “foundational” ontologies. A
number of these exist, and they provide a very high level basis for smaller, domain-
specific, ontologies [9].13 When specialized domain ontologies can be made consistent
(compatible) with a given upper ontology, this implies that the logical structure that
inheres in the domain ontology does not violate the relations in the upper ontology.
If multiple domain ontologies are all consistent with the same upper ontology, this
implies that the domain ontologies—at least in principle—ought to be harmonizable
with each other.
The present work is consistent with the Basic Formal Ontology (BFO).14 We
discuss some of the problems of harmonization of ontologies in the conclusions below,
but for the most part this matter and its related problems are not addressed in detail
here.
2.4 Machine Representations of Ontologies
In order to make use of an ontology, it must be represented in some formal language
that is capable of serialization. Specifically, we must be able to store, transmit, and
process the ontologies by machine.
In recent years, a number of languages for this representation problem in on-
13Examples include SUMO, mentioned above (http://www.ontologyportal.org/); GFO, the
General Formal Ontology (http://www.onto-med.de/ontologies/gfo/); DOLCE (http://www.
loa-cnr.it/DOLCE.html); and Cyc (http://www.opencyc.org/); among others.
14More on BFO can be found at: http://www.ifomis.org/bfo/.
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tologies have been proposed and used. If one goes further back into the AI literature
there are other formats and languages—not explicitly tied to ontologies—that are
adequate for representing them, such as KIF, the Knowledge Interchange Format.15
Most of these languages implement some restriction on first-order logic. Restrict-
ing first-order logic in these languages is necessary to make the languages either
computable generally or to guarantee certain convergence or speed of processing
requirements.
For our purposes, serialization is the process of converting a complex data
structure into a form that can be stored in a file which can then be moved from
place to place on the internet or on a given intranet.16 The most common bottom-
level format for serialization in ontology research is XML (the eXtensible Markup
Language) and various extensions built on top of this, especially RDF (the Resource
Description Framework) and its schema language, RDFS.17
The current standard for representing ontology terms and their relationships on
the semantic web is the Web Ontology Language or OWL.18 Specifically we use
OWL2 for development of AIT. OWL is a family of languages with differing levels
of logical expressiveness. We make use of OWL2 Full, in principle, but the bulk of
our work is at the level of OWL2 DL (Description Logic), a restricted sublanguage
of OWL2 Full with better computational properties.
15KIF is important for this research, forming the core representation for PowerLoom (http:
//www.isi.edu/isd/LOOM/PowerLoom/) and providing a formal language for first-order logic.
See: http://logic.stanford.edu/kif/ and http://www.cs.umbc.edu/csee/research/kif/ for
more details.
16See http://www.parashift.com/c++-faq-lite/serialization.html for more on serializa-
tion generally.
17XML: http://www.w3.org/XML/; RDF: http://www.w3.org/RDF/; RDFS: http://www.w3.
org/TR/rdf-schema/.
18See: http://www.w3.org/TR/owl2-overview/ for details. See http://www.w3.org/TR/
owl2-xml-serialization/ for specific details of OWL serialization.
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3 The Adversary–Intent–Target (AIT) Model
3.1 Development of the AIT Model
The AIT model begins with a model statement regarding a terrorist attack. This
statement is a simple sentence in natural language:
The AIT Model Statement: A terrorist attack occurs when an ad-
versary, with intent and capability, uses a weapon against a target.
This statement expresses a particular point of view (POV) toward terrorist at-
tacks, and any POV implies a corresponding ontology. What we do in the AIT
modeling process is develop the appropriate ontology for breaking up the world-at-
large into parts and relations that reflect the assumptions embedded in this model
statement. Part of the larger project for BOOT—and also the associated computing
research this AIT model was developed to support—is to allow multiple, overlapping
ontologies to coexist and exchange data despite their differences in POV.
This particular model statement, for instance, clearly requires definitions for
words such as “attack,” “adversary,” “intent,” “weapon,” “target,” etc. Analysis
of the word “adversary” leads almost immediately to concepts such as “organiza-
tion” (as in a “terrorist organization”) and that leads to the requirement that we
also specify the complementary concept of a non-terrorist organizations (called “law-
ful organizations” in AIT). All of these words must be analyzed by subject matter
experts, with guidance by the ontology curator(s).
This analysis proceeds in a mixture of formal and informal analysis of words,
until certain critical words keep appearing; these critical words become the basic
terms of the ontology. Once the controlled vocabulary of terms is fixed, the relations
among the terms must be determined. This is not a simple or linear process; as the
relations are set, some terms stop making sense as they have been used, which in
turn changes the term’s definitions, which then changes other relations, and so on.
As this developmental process iterates, eventually a core of terms and relations begin
to form which makes sense to the team of subject-matter experts.19
19 We discuss this further in the conclusions, but it makes sense to use graphical tools to produce
draft ontology pictures. While a picture of a tree-like structure does not contain the complete
ontology information, it does capture enough detail to be useful for workgroup discussions. In
our development we used CMAP (http://cmap.ihmc.us/) and yED (http://www.yworks.com/
en/products_yed_about.html). The CMAP tools come from an older community which has a
very idiosyncratic way of conducting conceptual analysis; we found the yED editor more useful,
especially for pictures made for publication. Unfortunately, neither tool is open source software,
13
AIT has a number of terms, such as LawfulOrganization, AdversaryOrga-
nization, Organization, Weapon, Place, and Intent, among many others. (The
labeling system and other details will be discussed in section 3.2.) Additionally,
other auxiliary terms appear to fill out these concepts, seeming proper nouns such
as KKK (the Ku Klux Klan) as a specific AdversaryOrganization, and generic
nouns like NuclearWeapon as a kind of weapon.20
In the analysis of the model statement, certain relations among terms become
apparent. For example, each AdversaryOrganization has an Intent (or more
than one); so one of the relations in AIT is hasIntent. Answering the following sorts
of questions leads to a rich vocabulary of terms and relations: What are adversaries?
Which intents do they have? Which adversaries are likely to prefer bombs over
economic attacks? A particular adversary group has access to which types of weapons?
What kinds of targets are vulnerable to which kinds of attacks? Etc.
It is important to note that the AIT model is just one way of structuring knowl-
edge; specifically, it organizes information about terrorism in a way that emphasizes
the enabling resources, knowledge, and motivations that terrorist groups have at
their disposal. A system such as BOOT would have to have a number of ways of
structuring knowledge that would allow different analysts to organize the world ac-
cording to the problems they address and structures that are relevant to their work.
The modeling here develops only one point of view, albeit a realistic and important
one.
Following the type of analysis described above suggested several taxonomies and
specific relationships among these taxonomies as a starting point. In addition, several
singonomies also appeared naturally in the analysis. The complete assembly of these
separate trees yielded the AIT ontology.
As mentioned above (section 2.3), we work within the metaphysics of the Basic
Foundational Ontology (BFO), which for our purposes divides things in the world
into material entities and their parts, the qualities which material entities can have,
and processes in which material entities participate. So in discussing AIT’s details we
will need to introduce some metaphysical terminology near the top of our ontology.
which precludes using either as a basis for building an ontology development tool with a graphic
orientation (something that the field needs).
20As mentioned above, we treat all terms in the ontology as sets, so seeming proper nouns are
still sets, with the subset relation, and not individual elements, which would require the element-of
relation. See section 2.1 and footnote 5 (on page 4).
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Figure 3: The backbone taxonomy of AIT, with the top three levels and the path to
TerroristAttack. Arrows indicate subclass relationships.
3.2 Structure of AIT
In the discussion of the AIT ontology, we use the following notation. Terms, such as
“adversary organization” are labeled in capital camelCase (also called CamelCase)
and set in boldface font, as in AdversaryOrganization. (On occasion, a label
will be pluralized, as in AdversaryOrganizations.) Relations between terms are
labeled in boldface (lower) camelCase, as in the relation “results in” which is labeled
resultsIn. The label for a term (relation), and the term (relation) itself, will be
used interchangeably as grammatical necessity demands. Generally this will cause
no confusion. This notation and the rules of use follow common practices in ontology
research.
3.2.1 High-Level Classes
The high level classes within AIT are shown in figure 3, and will be referred to more
fully as we proceed.
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Figure 4: A TerroristAttack requires targets, weapons, and adversaries. Adver-
saries require capabilities and intents. Arrows indicate various relationships as la-
beled.
The top two tiers, Thing and the three concepts directly below it (Quality,
MaterialEntity, and ProcessualEntity) are from BFO and are used according
to the definitions given there.21 The complete set of relationships used in AIT, and
their logical restrictions, are shown in the table in the appendix. (See page 31.)
Our basic modeling statement (section 3.1 on page 13) is translated into the
OWL framework as follows: A TerroristAttack is an Event with a minimum of
one Target, using a minimum of one Weapon, and involving a minimum of one
AdversaryOrganization as an agent that has both the Capability and Intent.
See figure 4. Events, whether they are terrorist events or natural disasters, are kinds
of ProcessualEntity (processes) which occur in some Place (which is a kind of
MaterialEntity), as shown in figure 3.
3.2.2 Adversary Organizations
AdversaryOrganization in figures 4 and 5 is an Organization, which is a Ma-
terialEntity within the BFO terminology. We distinguish a LawfulOrganization
such as a police force from an AdversaryOrganization, while maintaining that
both classes have the characteristics of an Organization, such as that any Organi-
21General information at http://www.ifomis.org/bfo. The manual and definitions are located
at: http://www.ifomis.org/bfo/documents/manual.pdf.
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Figure 5: The Adversary Taxonomy. Solid arrows indicate the subclass relationship.
The Organization concept is the same as in figure 3. Disjointness constraints are not
represented in this figure, only subclass relationships. Note Hezbollah and Hamas
are both subclasses of ReligiousExtremist (indirectly) and CountrySponsored
(directly).
zation has members who are Persons (also material entities, for simplicity). In the
current version of AIT, an AdversaryOrganization also can have an Intent, and
a Capability, often more than one of both. Organizational intents are those such
as stated in charters, on organizational websites, or presented by the spokespeople
of a given group. Capabilities are reflected in the knowledge, training, or experience
of its members or equipment in the organizations possession, for instance.
An AdversaryOrganization does not necessarily have a relationship to Place;
those relations will need to be added to describe the place(s) where members of
the organization are likely to be found, and the places that are their theaters of
operations. The representation of capabilities and places, and any associated details,
will be modeled at a later date.
The primary divisions of adversary organizations (AdversaryOrganization)
are shown in Figure 5, and include CriminalAdversary and PoliticalAdversary,
which are not disjoint sets—a group such as the Aryan Brotherhood could be both
a criminal and a political adversary. Within our model, the PoliticalAdversary
class includes the following subclasses: NationalSeparatist, ReligiousExtremist,
RightWing, SocialRevolutionary, and CountrySponsored. The Religiou-
sExtremist includes the following disjoint subclasses: ChristianAdversary (e.g.,
the KKK), IslamicAdversary (further subdivided into Sunni and Shi’a (Shia),
which are disjoint), and OtherReligiousAdversary (e.g., AumShinrikyo). A
group may fall into several of these categories, such as Hamas which is both Coun-
trySponsored and ReligiousExtremist, specifically Sunni; or Hezbollah which
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is also CountrySponsored and ReligiousExtremist, but is Shia. By making
terms such as Sunni and Shia disjoint or, at a higher level, making ChristianAd-
versary and IslamicAdversary disjoint, we enforce that no organization fall under
both terms in these pairs of terms.22 The fact that the subclasses are disjoint must
be taken into account, as two groups could have very different expressed intents and
capabilities, and thus the forms that their attacks take on would likely be different
as well.
3.2.3 Intents of Adversary Organizations
The intentions of each subclass of AdversaryOrganization can be denoted at var-
ious levels; for instance, if ReligiousExtremist was defined by having the intention
of converting people to their religion through their attacks, then each subclass of
ReligiousExtremist would inherit that as an intention. However, the AumSh-
inrikyo may have the Intent of Anarchy without FinancialGain, while Hamas
wants to change US foreign policy (ChangingGovPolicy)as well as having Finan-
cialGain; thus we would denote that multiplicity of intents specifically for those
subclasses.23
This can be seen in part in figure 6, which shows the hasIntent relationships
between the various of the AdversaryOrganization and Intent subclasses. For
example, AlQaeda is represented as having four intents: ReligiousConversion,
ChangingGovPolicy, EconomicDistress, and HarmingHumans. They do not
have the intent of Anarchy, for example, or the specific intent of FinancialGain,
except in so far as they require financial support for their operations.
3.2.4 Weapons & Targets
The Object class (from figure 3) includes the subclasses of Weapon, Target, and
WeaponizableComponent, as shown in figure 7 (on page 20). All objects exist in
some Place (though that place can change with time, and time is not yet modeled
in AIT).
22The authors appreciate that in reality disjoint subclasses may, from time to time, cooperate for
some operational or common goal, but for the purposes of keeping this model simple, we have not
addresses such subtleties. We also realize that for every disjoint distinction in any given ontology
there is almost always an exception that can not be expressed within the ontology’s controlled
language.
23For the present, ChangingGovPolicy refers to changing US government policy; modeling the
intent of changing policies of other governments is being planned for the AIT ontology.
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Figure 6: A portion of the adversary organizations and intents represented in AIT.
(The full collection is hard to visualize clearly.) The Intent taxonomy is indicated
in yellow. Solid unlabeled arrows indicate subclass relations, as in previous figures.
The dashed labeled arrows between subsets of AdversaryOrganization shown here
and the various Intents indicate the hasIntent relationship.
The Weapon class is broadly classified by subtypes: ChemicalWeapon, Cy-
berWeapon, BiologicalWeapon, RadiologicalWeapon, NuclearWeapon, and
ExplosiveWeapon (commonly referred to as CBRNE). There are other taxonomies
of weapon types and components which could be incorporated into AIT to make it
more complete, so that the individual components of a biological weapon, for ex-
ample, could be classified as such. The key point for AIT is that the subclasses of
weapon define the subclasses of TerroristAttack: A BiologicalAttack requires a
BiologicalWeapon, while a CyberAttack requires a CyberWeapon, a Nucle-
arAttack requires a NuclearWeapon, and so on. This does not rule out multiple
heredity—an attack could be both Explosive and Chemical, for example.
The Target taxonomy, only partially refined within the AIT representation
at present, is shown in figure 8. The Target class is subdivided into Public-
Sector and PrivateSector, with the PublicSector class including NGO targets
(NGOTarget) and GovernmentTarget. The PrivateSector is broken into sec-
19
tors by industry, which can be expanded as needed in two ways, first by adding
more high-level industries and second by working down the subclasses to individual
instances, such as a particular military base or a specific cruise ship.
There are other taxonomies of types of targets that could be incorporated to
make it more complete (power plants, military bases, schools, the White House,
Figure 7: The Object taxonomy. The top concept here, Object, is the same as in
figure 3. Arrows indicate subclass relations.
Figure 8: A portion of the Target taxonomy. Arrows indicate subclass relations.
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Figure 9: Different types of attacks result in different impacts (outcomes). From
the left is the TerroristAttack taxonomy; from the right, the Impact taxonomy.
Plain arrows indicate subclass relationships; dotted arrows indicate the resultsIn
relationship between attack types and their impacts. For clarity, the resultsIn
relation is only shown for biological, explosive, and chemical attacks. The complete
AIT ontology contains this relation for all of the attack types.
etc.). Some targets exist in a Place, which are divided into the Continental United
States (CONUS) or outside it (OCONUS), and can of course be subdivided into
regions, states, cities, townships and eventually exact latitude and longitude. Other
targets may also be temporally defined, such as the event/target called the “Super
Bowl,” or a Presidential Inauguration; we have excluded the temporal aspects of this
ontology at present for simplicity, although we recognize its critical importance.
3.2.5 Outcomes & Impacts
The Outcome or impact of a TerroristAttack is a ProcessualEntity (see figure
3), and can be broadly classified by its HumanHealthImpact, psychological impact
(PsychologicalImpact), EconomicImpact, and GovernanceImpact. Different
kinds of terrorist attacks have different impacts, as shown in figure 9.
The different impacts (or types of Outcome) have a relationship to the original
intents of an AdversaryOrganization as shown in figure 10 with the supportsIn-
tentTo relation.
A key question in AIT is the link between the intentions of an AdversaryOrga-
nization and the types of attacks they are likely to choose as a result of those inten-
tions. The adversary chooses the attack type based, at least in part, on the Outcome
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Figure 10: Examples of the supportsIntentTo relation between the Outcome of
an attack and the Intent of the original AdversaryOrganization. Plain arrows
indicate the subclass relationship; dashed arrows indicate the supportsIntentTo
relationship.
they expect it to have, and whether that expected outcome supports their original
intent. In figure 10, we show the relationship between types of Outcome and types
of Intent. A HumanHealthImpact supports the intent of HarmingHumans,
for example, while a GovernanceImpact can support the intent of changing gov-
ernment policy (ChangingGovPolicy), and an EconomicImpact supports the
intent of creating EconomicDistress. This is clearly an oversimplification; it is an
initial model of the very complicated factors that affect the likelihood of a particular
kind of attack based on what the adversary is trying to achieve. With these rela-
tionships in place, we can reason that the groups most likely to be interested in a
biological weapon are those with the intent of harming humans and causing economic
and psychological distress, and those with the sole intent of religious conversion are
not high priority ones to consider as likely planning or executing a biological attack.
In figure 11, we show a portion of the ontology that relates TerroristAttack
types, the kinds of Intent held by various AdversaryOrganization types, and
various types of Outcome. In this figure we can see that the intent to ChangeGov-
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Figure 11: A portion of the ontology relating how attack types and outcomes im-
plicate an adversary’s intents. Solid arrows indicate subclass relationships unless
otherwise labeled ; dashed and labeled arrows indicate the resultsIn relationship;
dashed/dotted labeled arrows indicate the supportsIntentTo relationship between
outcomes and intents. Solid labeled arrows indicate the hasIntent relationship be-
tween an AdversaryOrganization and their Intents. Thus, ChangeGovPolicy
is held as an Intent by AumShinrikyo, and Hamas; and it isSupportedBy Gov-
ernanceImpact and PsychologicalImpact, which come from BiologicalAttacks
(among others).
Policy is supported by any attack which results in either PsychologicalImpact or
GovernanceImpact, for instance. As a BiologicalAttack resultsIn both of these
outcomes, we can deduce that the groups which have the Intent of changing govern-
ment policy might choose a BiologicalAttack. So adversaries such as AumSh-
inrikyo and Hamas are reasonable suspects for such attacks. Other groups, such
as the Taliban which are modeled here as focusing on ReligiousConversion, are
therefore not likely agents of a BiologicalAttack.
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3.2.6 Instances
Within the OWL framework, instances are the final (terminal) nodes in the graph,
the specific entities in the real world which we are talking about. A particular
gun in someone’s hands is an instance of Gun; a particular vial of weaponized
anthrax is an instance of WeaponizedAnthrax; thus what we know about the
class Gun, in general, applies to that particular gun, and what we know about the
class WeaponizedAnthrax applies to that specific vial. Instances inherit all of the
properties of their class. (Hence, instance-of has a strong similarity to element-of as
used in mathematics, see section 2.1.)
The human members of an organization, however, do not as individuals carry all
of the properties of their organizations; what we know to be true about Al Qaeda—
as a whole group—is not necessarily true of a given individual who is a member
of Al Qaeda. Thus, a member of the group Al Qaeda is not an instance of the
set (term) AlQaeda. Individual human beings have a “member of” relationship to
their organizations which is clearly a different relationship from “instance of” above.
“Member of” is called memberIn in AIT notation.24
However, the converse is not completely identical in the analysis; there is an
asymmetry present. If a memberIn an organization is known to personally (as an
individual) have some capacity or expertise, then the organization—simply by the
fact of that member’s presence in the group—has that capacity or expertise. For
instance, if there is a particular person who is a nuclear engineer, and this member
joins a particular group, then that group now has a nuclear engineering expertise.
Various terrorist attacks are instances of the class of terrorist attack. Knowing all
the details about the assassination of JFK is not particularly helpful at the present
time, though that can be modeled as an example within this framework. However,
knowing the details of the recent (2011) attack in Norway: Who was the adversary?
What weapons did he use? Which targets did he select, and why? allows us to infer
some capacities and intents, which in the context of an ongoing incident, provides
relevant support for intelligence reasoning.
24There is no explicitly defined “instance of” relation in AIT, as OWL ontologies automatically
have such a relation.
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4 Discussion
We have presented a preliminary model of a knowledge structure that could be useful
for intelligence analysis. Starting with a model statement regarding what constitutes
a terrorist attack, and developing from that statement a framework of concepts and
relationships which can be used to answer questions regarding who? (which terrorist
organizations exist and what are their characteristics); what? (what kind of weapons
are used for what kind of attack, and what kind of attack leads to what kind of
outcome); where? (geographical location as well as classes of targets); and why?
(the intentions or motivations that lead to different choices of attacks, weapons, and
targets). This model serves as a foundation for the more complex semantics within
pre-incident analysis. Several choices were made in the development of AIT which
require more discussion.
4.1 Ontological Commitments & Consistency
We discovered a number of upper-ontology related problems for a general ontology
for terrorism research such as BOOT. The approach of using a single upper ontology
to enforce consistency in smaller specialized domain ontologies, while appealing in
its simplicity, suffers from a number of technical problems. These problems are very
similar to problems in the foundations of mathematics. For instance, while set theory
provides a common framework that can express almost all of mathematical structure,
the set-theoretic expressions of these structures are so complex as to be unusable for
practical work. In a similar way, enforcing the strictures of a single upper ontology
onto multiple domain ontologies for terrorism research makes some things easy to
express and other things too complex.
For instance, consider analyses that are political, social network based, economic,
technological, and logistic. While there might be an upper ontology that can, in
principle, express domain-specific languages for all of these, it is likely that the
initial choices in how to structure language about the world that are made by a
biologist thinking about biological weapons manufacture are quite different from an
economist looking at terrorist funding flows, or an analyst concerned with terrorist
social networks. If a single upper ontology makes it easy to talk about one domain
at the expense of making another very hard to talk about, that is not a practical
solution. Two approaches are currently being followed in this line.
The first approach uses very abstract upper ontologies as bases for larger, more
detailed ontologies. BFO, for example, plays a central role in biomedical ontolo-
gies, with a goal of representing medical results, biological experimental processes,
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and related biological and biomedical knowledge; all the ontologies within the Open
Biomedical and Biological Ontology (OBO) Foundry are committed to working
within the BFO framework. DOLCE, in contrast, is the exemplar for all the Wonder-
web ontologies, with a focus on semantic web applications (though the Wonderweb
project ended its funding some years ago, the ontological work has continued in
business and education applications).25 Other upper-level ontologies have also been
developed over time.26
The AIT division of things into MaterialEntity, ProcessualEntity, and Qual-
ity classes is driven by the metaphysics of the Basic Formal Ontology. BFO divides
the world into things which occur or unfold over time, known as occurrents (processes
and temporal durations, for example), and things which exist in time as a whole,
continuing in time as themselves, known as continuants. These two divisions exist at
the topmost level of BFO, and there are no other concepts at this level. Within the
occurrent branch of BFO is the ProcessualEntity that AIT models at its top level;
within the continuant branch of BFO is found the MaterialEntity and the Quality
classes that make up the rest of the AIT upper level. BFO has other subdivisions
within continuants and occurrents, but the AIT model does not use them, so we
defer discussion of these BFO terms.
BFO is a realist (revisionary) ontology, with the goal of modeling what actually
exists in the world. This is not the only way to proceed; other foundational ontolo-
gies such as DOLCE have a cognitive bias (also referred to as a descriptive ontology),
modeling how humans talk and think about the world, rather than strictly modeling
what exists.27 DOLCE includes in its top-level divisions both continuants and oc-
currents, as BFO does, but distinguishes “qualities” as a branch that is distinct from
either of these. It also includes at this highest level a fourth term, “abstract” which
is used to cover things that lack spatial or temporal qualities, such as “facts” (which
BFO does not include explicitly at all). Thus, temporal intervals such as “the two
months that it will take to grow a particular antibiotic” are considered a subclass of
abstract in DOLCE, but would be under occurrents in BFO.
This distinction might seem trivial, and one might argue that as long as both ways
of thinking about the world allow us to represent the information we have about those
“two months,” it doesn’t matter which foundational ontology we use. This is a valid
25DOLCE and WonderWeb: http://wonderweb.man.ac.uk/; business and education
applications of WonderWeb: http://stlab.istc.cnr.it/stlab/The_Semantic_Technology_
Laboratory_%28STLab%29.
26See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upper_ontology_(information_science) for a list of
upper ontologies. (Retrieved on 2011-08-24.)
27See: http://wonderweb.semanticweb.org/deliverables/documents/D18.pdf. For more on
terminology used to describe upper ontologies, see [9].
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argument, up to a point. However, by choosing a particular upper-level ontology,
the ontology builders make an “ontological commitment,” committing to dividing
the world according to the metaphysics of that particular ontology, and therefore
constraining or limiting what can be said within the ontological representation. For
instance, classes in any foundational ontology inherit certain characteristics and can
participate in certain kinds of relationships but not in others. The fact that we model
those “two months” as a ProcessualEntity constrains what we can say about them.
It allows us to infer that asking whether those “two months” are “blue,” for example,
is not a meaningful question, as processes in BFO and abstracts in DOLCE can’t
have qualities like color.
BFO in its original instantiation, however, could not model intentions or desires
or the fact that a particular assertion was incorrect. DOLCE, in contrast, was built
to include the ability to represent what someone is thinking about. We have worked
around this limitation in AIT by modeling Intent as a subclass of Quality, which is
consistent with the BFO usage of a quality as being a property of other things. This
choice introduces no logical inconsistencies in AIT. However, we may find that on
expanding the AIT vocabulary that what are cognitively simple concepts (e.g., “we
thought person A was in Lebanon at time T, but that was wrong”) are very complex
to represent in the BFO framework, and more straightforward in the DOLCE or
another framework. While using the BFO approach has been sufficient for AIT to
this point, it may need to be reconsidered as modeling becomes more complex.
This top-down approach hides much of the consistency problem behind a wall of
more usable ontologies, each of which models a non-overlapping set of topics within
the framework of the upper-level ontology. So far this approach has not resolved the
largest problems.
The second approach is to acknowledge that complete logical consistency may
be impossible, and instead to modify logical analysis and reasoning procedures that
operate on this (necessarily) inconsistent knowledge. In other words, we build rea-
soning agents that are tolerant to inconsistencies in their ontologies. Approaches of
this sort go by names such as paraconsistent ontologies, paraconsistent logics, non-
monotonic reasoning, default reasoning, defeasible reasoning, etc. We are currently
investigating these ideas in our ongoing research.
4.2 Future directions
Even within the foundational ontological framework we have chosen, key terms and
relations within the AIT model are still missing. For instance: there is currently
no rigorous connection between certain subclasses of expertise or Capability (and
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the corresponding inferred ability to carry out a particular attack); the differing
levels of granularity desired by different users has not been addressed; there is no
representation of social factors, such as perceived authority; and (fundamental to
ontologies in general) the problems of time, probability, and conditional statements
have not been addressed. We consider each of these below.
A terrorist organization may have an Intent which is compatible with their
likelihood of choosing to carry out a nuclear attack, but if they do not have the
appropriate knowledge to acquire and deliver the appropriate weapon to their chosen
target, any intent that they may have is not actionable. Intent simply suggests what
kind of attacks a group would be interested in trying to obtain the expertise and
weaponry for; it is a model of desire, rather than ability. Modeling the information
required to determine whether a group has the ability—the expertise and capacity—
to carry out a specific attack, is currently outside the AIT model.
This leads to the related problem of granularity, and the ability to expand upon
the current framework to include the levels of fine detail that are required for specific
questions. How much detail do we specify for the processes of building weapons for
attacks? Knowing that X is needed for building weapons of types Y and Z may
be more important for identifying what kind of attack is imminent, and thus more
important to represent, than knowing in detail how X is used in constructing the
weapon. However, if we want to be able to infer that chemical P could be used to
build weapon Q, so that we can add P to a list of materials with restricted access, say,
then we may need to include more detail about the processes of weapon construction.
Social relationships are not modeled in the AIT system; the idea that some spe-
cific person has the authority to carry out some specific action, or that a given
organization believes that they have the authority to carry out an attack, is not
represented. For instance, the role that fatwas play in authorizing attacks is not
included. Nor are collaborations, or other tribal relationships that might lead to
either obstructions or advantages for some given group carrying out a given attack.
This leads directly into a problematic area for ontologies and descriptive logic
structures generally: anything that is modeled in an ontology is always considered
to be a true statement. That is, statements are always either true or false, false
statements are not supposed to be included, and false conclusions are a sign that
something went wrong with either the knowledge base or the reasoning software.28
However, in many domains statements are neither true nor false, but may have a
probability of being true, depending on the evidence to date or the reliability of the
28The paraconsistent approaches mentioned above can approach this problem by allowing addi-
tional truth values, such as the set of values {true, false, neither, both}, or sets of truth values
including the idea of “unknown.”
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source of the statement. In this particular domain, we may strongly believe that
some given person was in, say, London last year and met with members of terrorist
Group X, but we don’t know this with absolute certainty. A vial of anthrax that
went missing from a military facility could be used by Groups X, Y, or Z; but we
can not be completely sure if Group Y has the expertise to turn it into a weapon
and deliver it to a target. Or perhaps we were informed that Group Z had available
personnel near the military facility at the time, and therefore may be in possession
of the vial, but we do not completely trust the source of this intelligence.
The AIT system can not, at this point, take these sorts of partial, conditional,
or probable truth into account. There are many interesting options available to add
this capacity to AIT, including such tools as probabilistic logics and reasoning, fuzzy
logic, possibility theory, and evidence theory [10].29
Another challenge is the representation of time. For instance, AIT cannot repre-
sent the concept that some piece of information was true at a time in the past (and
was necessary for reasoning at that time) but is no longer true and should not be
used in current reasoning. Much of the content of AIT are facts considered to be al-
ways true: Hamas can not suddenly become a right wing Christian organization, for
example, and a biological attack must involve a biological weapon, by any reasonable
definition. These sorts of facts do not change. But it may be, for example, that some
terrorist group did not have the expertise or intent to use a nuclear weapon in 1995,
but they do have that expertise now; or they did have it last year, but with the death
of their expert they no longer have the needed expertise. That is, if we have built a
reasoning system that can infer that Group X has a given expertise because person Y
(who is a member of Group X) has the expertise, and we remove person Y from the
knowledge base, then we will correctly infer that Group X does not currently have
the expertise. However, deleting all of the information about person Y may lead
to other problems; we would probably need to include more complex constraints,
such as the concept that individuals are alive at certain times—person Y was alive
from 1950 to 2010, it is now 2011—and the concept that only the expertise of living
individuals is used in inferring the expertise of an organization. This is an issue
that has helped shape ontological development for situational awareness [7], which
needs to represent rapid changes in a situation over time, and an OWL ontology to
allow changes over time exists [6]. This kind of time-dependency greatly increases
the complexity of the system by including a time stamp on all statements, so that
some statements are always true, and some are true only for various limited intervals
of time. The inclusion of time both in the representation and in the reasoning will
29T. Caudell, F. Gilfeather, M. R. Taha, and D. Weinberg, Pre-Incident Indicator Analysis (PIIA)
System, UNM ECE Technical Report, in preparation, August 2011.
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be a future development.
4.3 The larger framework
The current AIT model is not the full implementation of BOOT required for prag-
matic, real-world, use. Besides the actual modeling work described above that is
needed to represent more of the concepts and relationships used in intelligence anal-
ysis, the actual ontology (or ontologies, across different domains of expertise) requires
connections to other systems; connections to knowledgebases and databases, to meth-
ods for adding or updating specific information and instances, and to mechanisms
for updating the core model itself.
The approach to linking ontologies and repositories, to update views based on new
information and link different ontologies, is the topic of other parts of this project
[5]. Systems for new information to be accounted for within the model need to be
included, so that the most current information is retrieved and used in reasoning.
The cultural blocks to sharing information collected by different governmental agen-
cies across those agencies will not be solved by any knowledge engineering system;
however, a shared vocabulary and knowledge structure that could be agreed to is a
significant first step toward facilitating such data sharing for information fusion.
5 Supplemental Materials
This report, along with supplements, will also be available from Conjectural Systems
beginning in November 2011. These supplements include the OWL file for the AIT
ontology, as well as any future revisions of the ontology or errata for this paper.
Please go to www.conjecturalsystems.com to obtain the files.
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A AIT Relationship Table
The following table includes all of the relationships in AIT.
Relation Domain Range Usage
hasAgent Thing Adversary
Organization
This is the relationship between a ter-
rorist attack and the adversary organi-
zation(s) which orchestrated it.
hasTarget Thing Target This is the relationship between the
target of an attack and either the ad-
versary organization or the attack it-
self.
usesWeapon Thing Weapons This is the relationship between the
weapon used in the attack and either
the attack or the adversary organiza-
tion who is the agent of the attack.
hasLocation Thing Place The relationship of occurring or exist-
ing in some place.
occursIn Event Place The relationship between the event
and the place it occurs in. It is a sub-
type of hasLocation.
existsIn Material
Entity
Place The relationship between a material
entity and where it happens to be at a
given time. It is a subtype of hasLo-
cation.
resultsIn Terrorist
Attack
Outcome The relationship between a terrorist
attack and the predefined categories of
outcomes of interest.
supportsIntentTo Outcome Intent The relationship between the outcome
of an attack and the original intent of
the adversary organization.
hasIntent Adversary
Organization
Intent The relation between an adversary or-
ganization and any of its intents.
hasCapability Organization
or Person
Capability The relationship between an organiza-
tion and its capabilities, or between a
person and their capabilities.
hasMember Organization Person The relationship between an organiza-
tion and its members (persons).
memberIn Person Organization The inverse of hasMember.
targetOf Target Thing Inverse of hasTarget.
resultOf Outcome Terrorist
Attack
Inverse of resultsIn.
isSupportedBy Intent Outcome Inverse of supportsIntentTo.
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